Charles V and the English by Loades, David
Charles V and the English 
David Loades 
Universidad de SheíBed 
A conflict of principie and practice 
Had He been aware of it, Charles might well have felt himself to be the particular 
object of the Chínese curse «may you Uve in interesting times». Begining with the con-
quest of México, and ending with the Peace or Augsburg, there can have been few 
Imperial reigns more fraught with vital consequences for the future. A deeply traditional 
and conservative ruler, he found himself faced with new, and almost unprecedented 
problems, both in the New World and in the religious storms convulsing the Empire. 
Among the forces shaping these great eventes, the English occupied only a very minor 
place. Except for a few brief periods England, and particularly its eccentric king, Hen-
ry Vin, rated as Uttle more than an unavoidable nuisance, rather Uke the gout which 
troubled Charles increasingly as he got older. 
As Archduke of Burgundy from the age of six, Charles of Ghent had grown up 
with the English as his next door neighbours. English cloth merchants and their factors 
ha been a familiar sight in aU the major trading centres of the Low Countries for over 
a hundred years; and by the time that the great Bourse was built in Antwerp in 1532, 
English cloth was the most valuable single commodity fuelling the vital commercial 
prosperity of those cities from which the Empero's bankers drew their liquid capital'. 
The importance of this trade to both sides meant that it featured to an unusual extent 
in the high level diplomatic exchanges which took place between the rulers of the two 
áreas, notably the treaties of 1496 and 1506 .^ Charles took merchants seriously; he 
could hardly afford not to considering the role which the Fuggers played in his election 
campaign of 1519. This was why he treated the great commercial cities, and particularly 
Antwerp, with kid gloves, respecting their privileges even when those privileges were 
' BissoN, D. R, The MerchantAdventurersof England, AUP, 1993, pp. 1-12. 
^ The magnus intercursus and the malus intercursus. RYMER, T., Foedera, conventiones, litterae, etc., 
Xn, London, 1704-1735, pp. 578-588. 
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used to protect heretical printing presses .^ The city of London was more ¡mportant 
to the Emperor, as a part of Antwerp's commercial hinterland, than was the king of 
England, either as ally or opponent. It had been the logic of this commercial link which 
has re-established the Anglo-Burgundian alliance in the 1460s, after Philip the Fair 
had broken it off in 1435. The ostensible reason had been a common suspicion of 
France, but Edward IV was heavily dependent upon the support of London, and such 
a poücy reflected the city's wishes *. This was the alliance which Charles inherited as 
Archduke, and although it is unlikely that he gave it much serious thought before his 
prioritíes transferred to Spain in 1516, it represented a kind of normality which was 
thoroughly familiar to him. 
The Low Countries over which Charles ruled did not constitute the whole of fifteenth 
century Burgundy, but rather that part of the Burgundian lands which the Duchess 
Mary had conveyed to Maximilian, Charles's grandfather, on their marriage in 1478'. 
The residue had been absorbed by France. Charles VHI of France had also implicidy 
challenged Maximilian's leadership of Christendom in 1494, not only by invading Italy, 
part of which was Imperial territory, but also by expressing the intention of leading 
a crusade against the Turks. The leading opponent of Frenh pretensions in the 1490s 
has not, in fact, been the aggrieved MaximÜian, but Ferdinand of Aragón whose interests 
in Italy were similarly threatend .^ Consequendy when Charles succeeded Ferdinand 
(who was his maternal grandfather) in Spain, he was also the heir to a hostile relationship 
with France, which augmented the hostility which he had already inherited as Archkuke. 
In contrast to this inexorable political logic, there was no substantial reason why Hen-
ry Vin of England should have been antí-French when he inherited his kingdom in 
1509. His father had treated France indifferentíy, not allowing either the Burgundian 
alliance or the marriage of his son Arthur to Catherine of Aragón to saddle him with 
any consistent animosity. Henry VIU, however, chose to go to war with France, just 
as he chose to marry his brother's widow, Catherine. Neither of these decisions was 
forced on him by circumstances, but rather aróse from his self image as a warlike and 
romantic renaissance prince, who was inspired by the heroics of his ancestor Henry V, 
almost a hundred years before. It was a portent of things to come. Throughout his 
long reign and moderately long life, Henry's pohcies continued to be driven more by 
' JOHNSON, A. G., and GILMONT, J . F., «Printing and the Reformation in Antwerp», in GILMONT 
(ed.) (trs. Karin Maag), The Reformation and the Book, Aldershot, 1998, pp. 188-213. 
•* There had been an inhibition of trade in october 1464, which had emphasised the need for 
a renewed agreement. Ross, C , Edward TV, London, 1974, p. 105. 
' Holland, Zeeland, Flanders. Brabant, Artois, Hainault, Namur, Limburg and Luxemburg. In 
the course of his reign, Charles was to add Groningen, Friesland, Drenthe, Overijessel, Gelderland, 
Utrecht, Zutphen and Upper Geiders. 
*• Ferdinadn held the Kingdom of Naples, to which the French laid claim. 
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the imperatives of his personal agenda than by the needs of his kingdom .^ It was an 
attitude which Charles, who was similarly driven by a sense of public duty and respon-
sibility, was to find repeatedly and infuriatingly incomprehensible. 
Ferdinand's conduct as Henry's ostensible ally in the war of 1512-1514 had done 
nothing to improve Anglo-Spanish relations, but that situation died with the man who 
created it, and Catherine, whose influence with Henry was still strong at this time, 
busied herself on her nephew's behalf as she had on her father's. In 1519 Henry was 
a mature king; twenty eight years oíd and ten years into his reign. Charles has been 
on a steep leaming curve as king of Spain for three years, but was still a youth of 
19, with httle experience of the real exercise of power. Wheter either or them had 
any clear impression of the qualities of the other may be doubted, but all that was 
about to change. When the Emperor Maximilian died, Charles inherited a number of 
Imperial principalities as head of the Habsburg family. He did not inherit the Imperial 
dignity because that was elective, and there were some doubts that the Electors might 
not wish to chose a prince who was already as strong as the King of Spain. A number 
of candidates were canvassed, but only three eventually emerged; the kings of Spain, 
France and England. This immediately worked in Charles's favour, because he was 
already a prince of the Empire, and the motives of both the other candidates were 
regarded with justified suspicion. Henry took himself seriously, and his agents were 
insistent on his behalf, but he had neither a long purse ñor powerful backing, and 
probably would never have stood a chance, except as a compromise candidate if the 
other two had fought each other to a standstiU. That could have happened, because 
Francis I, was also in eamest, and had large resources. However, when it came to 
the point no one could match the power of the Habsburg connection, or its capacity 
to offer generous inducements. Wheter Charles needed to mortgage himself to the Fug-
gers as he did may be doubted, but his victoy was unequivocal, and altered the whole 
power structure of Europe **. Wolsey's laboriously worked peace treaty of 1518 was 
immediately under threat, as the Emperor set out to break down what he perceived 
as the Anglo-French entente which it had contained, and by the end of 1520 he had 
succeeded. 
It would have been impossible for Francis not to have felt threatened with the 
Emperor's territories virtually surrounding him; in the Low Countries, the Empire, 
Northern Italy and Spain; and this new situation gave England a strategic importance 
which it had not hitherto enjoyed. For all his warlike posturing, Henry could not over-
eóme the fact that his kingdom was now a second rate military power: but he was 
' The main motivators of Henry's policies were the desiere for dynastic security, the desire for 
unchallenged control over his own realm, and the desire for military glory. The best general discussion 
of the reign is stiU SCARISBRICK, J. J., Henry VIH, London, 1968. 
» BoNEY, R., Ihe European Dynastic States. 1494-1660, Oxford, 1991, pp. 109-114. Citing C,\R.^ NDE, 
R., Carlos \'y sus banqueros, Madrid, 1944-1949. 
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strong at sea, and regarded the Narrow Seas as his particular preserve'. Now that 
Communications between Spain and the Lew Countries were a matter of vital concern, 
and an English aUiance offered the French their only hope of escape from complete 
encirclement, Henry's desirability as an ally was suddenly enhanced. In the resulting 
competition for English friendship, Charles had several advantages, as we have already 
seen; and his pwsition was strengthened by the purely personal tensión between Francis 
and Henry, who were too much alike, and whose rivalry had surfaced at the Field 
of Cloth of Gold in the summer of 1520. By the end of that year the Emperor was 
hinting that he would like Cardinal Wolsey to be the next pope, and serious negotiations 
were in hand for a marriage between Charles and Henry's daughter Mary '°. The betroth-
al was finally agreed on the 14th september 1521. Althought both sides pretended great 
seriousness about this, its main objective was to shut out the French. Mary was five 
and Charles was twenty one. Even by the most optimistic calculation they would have 
had to wait seven years for cohabitation, and the Emperor needed an heir. In writing 
to his ambassador, Cuthbert Tunstall, Henry made it clear that he understood this 
clearly enough. Such a treaty «will not prevent the Emperor from marrying any woman 
of lawful age before our daughter comes to mature years, as he wiU only be bound 
to take her if he is then at liberty...» ". Following this treaty, Henry joined Charles 
in his inevitable war against France, but the two were aneasy allies, and the planned 
joint campaigns faüed to materiaÜse. Both were to blame. The Emperor switched pri-
orities from one campaign to another, leaving his ally high and dry (or rather wet, 
as it was an autumn campaign). Henry could not find the resources to mount a major 
invasión, and used his ally's uncertainties as an excuse to do very little ^^ . When Charles 
fiinally inflicted a crushing defeat on Francis at Pavia in 1525, he regarded Henry's 
attempts to exploit this situation with iH disguised contempt, and the latters's poverty 
left him able to do litde on his own account. 
A seismic shift was about to take place in Anglo-Imperial relations. In 1526 Charles 
abandoned his treaty with England, and married Isabella of Portugal. Henry's expressions 
of outrage and chagrín were largely theatrical because, as we have seen, he had already 
anticipated such an outcome. More importandy, he used the consequent negotiation 
for a French marriage to air his gathering uncertainties about his own unión with Cathe-
rine of Aragón. Briefly, the king needed an heir, and Catherine after many stiU births 
' SPONT, A . (ed.), Letters and Papen relating to the War with France, 1512-1514, Navy Records 
Society, Vn-XLVm, 1897; RODGER, N . A. M., The Safeguard of the Sea, London, 1977, pp. 164-175. 
'" Letters and Papers... of the Reign of Henry VIH, GAIRDNER.J. (ed.),etal., IH, London, 1862-1932, 
p. 1162. 
" Letters and Papera, JE, p. 1150. 
" GuNN, S. J., «The Duke of Suffolk's march on París in 1523», English Histórica! Review, 1986, 
núm. 101, pp. 596-634. 
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and miscarriages, was now passed the childbearing age '^. Henry and his subjects alike 
dreaded the unprecedented prospect of a ruling queen, and the king conveniendy con-
vinced himself that his marriage had contravened Divine law. When Charles found out 
that he was intending to seek an anullment, he was outraged. Not only was Catherine 
his aunt, she was also his loyal and astute ally at the English court. Equally important, 
however, was his profound conviction that Henry was wrong, and was seeking to exploit 
ecclesiastical weakness and confusión for an immoral purpose '•*. His implacable and 
successful opposition to the English campaign at Rome was to have far reaching con-
sequences. The Anglo-Imperial alliance collapsed, to be replaced with a chilly but platonic 
hostüity which lasted for nearly fifteen years. The Emperor's attitude placed him in 
a dñemma of his own making. With France, the Ottoman Empire and the Lutheran 
princes of Germany all threatening, he could ill afford to make another enemy. Did 
the reputation of an aunt whom he had hardly ever met really mean so much to him? 
I do not think so. I think that Charles's position was determined rather by the immense 
seriousness with which he took his responsibilites as the secular head of Christendom. 
He has his disagreements with successive popes, but the papal authority, like his own, 
was a prop of that supematural ordering of human affairs which God had established 
for his own purposes. 
No doubt the Emperor rejected Luther's theology but he did so not because he 
was unconvinced by (or even understood) his arguments, as because ¡t was has duty 
to uphold the due order of the church. Sometimes he may have felt that he was a 
better catholic than the pope, bur that was not really the point. The point was that 
God had raised him to the Imperial dignity so that he could ensure that the canon 
law was enforced by the temporal arm. Henry's eventual solution to his own problem, 
by claiming that he exercised the potestas jurisdictionh himself within his dominions 
thus offended against one of Charles's most deeply held convictions. This was not a 
question of sexual moraüty. Charles had more mistresses than Henry, and regarde them 
as disposable assets, but he refused to recognise Arme Boleyn as Henry's second queen, 
and always regarded their daughter Elizabeth as illegitimate. This attitude was faithfully 
reflected in the language employed by the ambassador who represented him in England 
throughout the chilly 1530s, the Savoyard nobleman Eustace Chapuys " . Chapuys was 
consistently outraged by the slights (real and imagined) to which Catherine and her 
daughter Mary were subjected; referring to Anne Boleyn as «the concubine» and Ehz-
" When the king first unburdened his conscience to the Aldermen of London, the response was 
distincdy sceptical. HALL, E. , The Union of the tuio noble and illustre famelies or Yorke and Lancastre, 
London, 1548, ELLIS, H . (ed.), 1809, p. 754. 
'•* On 29th july 1527, on receiving the first news of Henry's intentions from don Iñigo Mendoza, 
Charles wrote to the ambassador. «... we cannot in any manner be persuaded to beüeve in so strange 
a determination on the part of his serenity, and one wich is calculated to astonish the whole world, 
were it to be carried inte effect. In fact we do not beüeve it possible...» Letters and Papen, IV, il, 
p. 3312. 
" CHAPUYS did t^o tums of duty in England, from 1529 to 1536 and from 1542 to 1545. 
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abeth as «the little bastard». On his mater's behalf, Chapuys regularly lectured the 
king on the errors of his ways, and intrigued indefatigably with those English noblemen 
and churchmen who opposed Henry's policies. 
On several occasions he informed his master that even quite a small amount of 
financial or military assistance would be suffícient to topple the king from his throne 
and restore «right order». However, Charles did nothing, even when the Pilgrimage 
of Grace seemed to offer him a golden opportunity '^. One reason for this may have 
been that he did not have the available resources, but another was that his principies 
and the practicalities of the situation were puUing in opposite directions. He did not 
really want to see Henry dethroned and his country destablised. However badly he 
might be behaving, Henry was a legitímate ruler and there was no obvious altemative. 
Moreover, if he started putting his displeasure into effect, the result might be a most 
inconvenient Anglo-French alliance, especially as Henry was already angling for French 
support in the Curia ". 
For similar reasons Henry continued to put up with Chapuys's undiplomatic behav-
iour, and even more undiplomatic speeches, tuming a blind eye to his intrigues and 
to the moral support which he continued to offer Catherine and Mary, both of whom 
were defying the king to the best of their abOity. He lived in mortal fear that the Emperor 
and the King of France might bury the hatchet and tum against him to enforce the 
papal sanctions. So he endured the ambassador's speeches, and used his own agents 
abroad to increase suspicion and hostiÜty between the two major powers of Christendom. 
Catherine's death in january 1536 made litde difference to this situation. On the one 
hand, Charles was quite glad to be rid of her importunities '*, but on the other his 
support for papal attempts to forcé Henry to retum to her were now meaningless, 
and some fresh strategy had to be thought of. The Emperor was well informed about 
events in England, but even he was taken by surprise by the sudden fall of Arme Boleyn 
at the end of april. This represented success, of a sort, for his low-key policy, because 
one of the reasons for Anne's demise was that she had become an obstruction in the 
path of the powerful chief minister, Thomas Cromwell, who was seeking to use Cath-
erine's death as a means to restore Anglo-Imperial amity " . With Catherine and Arme 
both dead, there seemed a distinct possibility that Henry would renegotiate his relations 
with the papacy. Charles has always regarded the royal Supremacy as an ad hoc device 
on Henry's part to solve his succesion problem, which was one reason for his low key 
'* The most recent discussion of this major event, and of the Emperor's failure to respond to 
it, is BuSH, M. L., The Pilgrimage of Grace, Manchester, 1996. 
" BL Add. MS 48044; Letters and Papen, V, p. 791. Henry made his first formal approach to 
Francis early in 1531; SCARISBRICK, Henry VIH, pp. 305-306, 
"* LOADES, D . , Mary Tudor; a Ufe, Oxford, 1989, pp. 86-87- Catherine wrote persistendy to the 
Emperor, demanding action, but what action is not clear, since she was strongly opposed to a military 
solution. 
' ' Letters and Papen, K , p. 674; ITCS, E . W . , Anne Boleyn, Oxford, 1986, pp. 340-341. 
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reaction, and now it looked as thought normality might be restored - with no effort 
on his part. 
The king, however, had other ideas. After some hesitation he rejected negotiations 
with the Pope, and forced his recalcitrant but now exposed daughter Mary to accept 
his supremacy ^°. Chapuys was incandescent with raga and appregension, because the 
princess had narrowly escaped being tried for treason, and Anglo-Imperial relations went 
back into the freezer. Charles, however, was even more reluctant to take action than 
he had been in 1533. As his council had then pointed out, Henry had taken no action 
in contravention of the 1529 treaty of Cambrai, which had brought the last cycle of 
war to an end. The Emperor's connection with the Queen of England and her daughter 
was purely personal, and should not be allowed to díctate public policy ^'. The Emperor 
had opposed the imposition of a papal interdict on England, on the grounds that it 
would ruin many of his Netherlands subjects íf they were unable to do business with 
the islanders ^ .^ When Henry was personally excommunicated instead, all diplomatic 
contact with him should have been suspended, but Charles did no such thing. Ostensibly 
it was business as usual, although without any of the trappings of friendship. However, 
thorough the agency of Chapuys the Emperor was steadily building up a relationship 
with Mary. From time to time he toyed with the idea of using her as a figurehead 
for a rising against her father, and the princess seemed wiüing to co-operate. In 1535 
she wrote that she regarded him as her true father, and would never marry without 
his advice and consent. In october of the same year, at Chapuys's urging, she wrote 
to Cardinal Granvelle that «... the affairs of this kingdom will go to total ruin if his 
Majesty does not, for the service of God... take brief order and apply a remedy...» ^^  
this promising development was, however, cut short abruptly by Mary's surrender to 
her father's pressure in july 1536. Chapuys represented her as suffering agonies of con-
science for such a betrayal, but her own letters suggest a more complex state of mind. 
Later in the year she wrote both to Charles and Mary of Hungary declaring that she 
had now, been enlightened as to the rightness of her father's actions, and implying 
that she would no longer be a party to any action against him '^'. The Emperor was 
baffled, but had to accept what he was told, and their relationship drifted inconclusively. 
At no time did the Emperor show any sign of understanding what Henry was doing, 
or why he was doing it. To him the king was simply breaking the rules. A threat to 
the independence of a national kingdom posed by the marriage of a ruling queen was 
simply not within his comprehension. As a result he also failed to understand the support 
•'" BL Cotton MS Otho C x, fol. 289; Letters and Papers, X, p. 1136; also, Chapuys to the Emperor, 
Ist July 1536, Letters and Papers, XI, 7. 
'^ ' Consulta of 31st May 1533; Letters and Papers, VI, p. 568. 
-^ Charles to his ambassador in Rome, May 1533; Letters and Papers, VI, p. 569. 
' ' Letters and Papers, K , p. 596. 
'"• Letters and Papers, XII, p. 637, 1314. Lo.ADES, Mari Pudor, 108. 
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which Henry was receiving among his own people, a matter in whinch he was consistently 
misled by Chapuys ^'. They both understood the mindset of those who attacked Henry, 
from humble clergy to major nobles, but failed to comprehend that most Englishmen 
accepted Henry's actions as being in the interest of the realm, even if they personally 
sympathised with Catherine and Mary. Ñor did he understand the natura of English 
lawmaking, or the peculiar significance of parliament. The estates had no right to interfere 
with the succession, let alone the church, both of which were beyond their competence. 
The statutes in which Henry consistently embodied his decisions meant nothing to 
Charles, and he never seems to have grasped that Henry was rewriting the mlebook 
in a particularly English way. In consistent pursuit of his own principies, he never rec-
ognised any of Henry's subsequent marriages, because they were conducted while the 
realm was in schism, and was quite surprise to discover that when Henry died in 1547 
everyone in England, including Mary accepted Edward as his legitímate heir ^ .^ During 
the last decade of Henry's life, the Emperor's attitude towards him was distincdy schiz-
ophrenic. On the one hand he was a schismatic tyrant who should be deposed (an 
attitude which briefly looked threatening in 1538-1539); on the other he was a useful 
ally against France. From 1542 to 1544 king and Emperor fought side by side as they 
had in 1523, and then feU out again for sirmlar reasons, buy with no hint that Henry 
was an excommunicate who should have been oudawed from Christian society. Mean-
whQe English trade with Antwerp grew and flourished, untü the Merchant Adventurers 
annual fleet was worth in excess of £300,000 sterling, and Charles had no intention 
of kiUing the goose that laid such golden eggs ^'. 
Once he had got over his suprise at Edward's unchaUenged succession, the Emperor 
unenthusiastically recognised the minority govemment led by the Duke of Somerset. 
He would, he told the Protector, observe his existing treaties with the English Crow, 
but not extend them. Should the king of France attack Calais, he would come to 
Edward's aid, but if the attack was upon Boulogne (a much more likely contingency), 
then the english were on their own. Somerset, reaüsing that Henry ü , who succeeded 
his father in March 1547, was almost certain to resume Francis's last war when the 
circumstances were favourable, tried hard to improve his relations with Brussels, but 
the religious policy which he was simultaneously pursuing made that impossible *^. Hen-
ry's excommunication was not repeated against his son, who was only a child, and Charles 
had leamed from hard political experience that he must do business with heretical prin-
^' He had written to his ambassador in France in May 1533 that «... the people of England 
are scandalised at the king's barbarity...» (Letters and Papen, VI, p. 534). For a more balanced appraisal 
of the amount of support Henry was receiving, see ELTON, G . R., Policy and Pólice, Cambridge, 1973, 
passim. 
2* Calendar of State Papers, Spanish, TYLER, R. (ed.), et al.,IX, London, 1862-1954, pp. 7, 15 y 38. 
^' Based on the figure of 126,000 cloths calculated by Ralph Davis, England's Cherseas Trade, 
1500-1700, London, 1973, p. 52. 
2* BuSH, M. L-, The Govemment Policy of Protector Somerset, London, 1975, pp. 119-120. LOACH, 
J., Edward VI, London, 1999, p. 132. 
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ees; but he did not pretend to find them congenial. Consequendy, when Henry finally 
did attack in august 1549, the Emperor, whose own endemic wars with France were 
temporarily in remission, declinad to become involved. At the same tíme, in spite of 
her fañure to answer to his expectations, his relationship with Mary began to recover. 
The Princess has admantly refused to accept Somerset's Uniformity Act of 1549, and 
rejected the English liturgy when it carne into use at Whitsun. She did this, not on 
the ground that it was heretical, but because it contravened her father's settlement ^'. 
Edward, she maintained, could take no such action until he was of full age. This was 
hardly a view which commended itself to the Emperor, but it showed promise, and 
Mary was the heir to the throne. When Somerset was overthrown in october 1549, 
the princess declined to become involved in the subsequente scramble for power, and 
the reUgious conservatives who had looked to her for leadership were defeated. The 
Earl of Warwick, who led the Council from december 1549, inmediately renewed pres-
sure upon Mary to conform. She refused, and appealed to Charles as she had done 
in 1535. Henry n i had once told Chapuys that his master should mind his own business 
when it carne to relations between father and daughter '^', but Warwick could not afford 
to take so high a stand. Mary was a dangerous example of disobedience, but he dared 
not risk an open breach with the Emperor. 
In 1550 the situation became so tense that Mary decided to escape to the Low 
Countries. Charles was appalled, because if she ran away she would forfeit all chance 
of the succesion, but he allowed the plan to develop until, much to his relief, the princess 
herself changed her mind ^\ For the next three years she kept up her guerrilla war 
against the minority govemment. Her servants were harrassed and arrestad, but Warwick 
was not strong enough to act against her directly, and Charles was spared the embar-
rassment of having to decida what to do if she were imprisoned. By this time the Emper-
or's health was deteriorating. He was afflicted by gout, and sometimes unable to transact 
business for days, or even weeks at a time. Was with France, and reballion within the 
Empire, were resumad in 1552. His son Philip was now a grown man, and showing 
political abilitias of his own; but he was not popular in aither the Empire or the Low 
Countries, and was most at homa in Spain. Charle's half sister, Mary of Hungary and 
his chief minister, the Bishop of Arras, were consaquently his chief aides and supporters 
in the north. By the end of 1552 it is often difficult to tell whattar the Emperor himself 
was making decisions, or whather Mary and Arras were acting in his ñame '^. In the 
summar of 1553 ha was tirad and deeply dispiritad. The war with France was stalemated. 
^ Mary to the Council, 22nd June 1549. FoxE, J., Acts and Monuments, CAITLEY, S. R. (ed.), 
VI, London, 1837-1841, p. 7, LOADES, Mary Tudor, pp. 145-146. 
"> Letters and Papers, Vil, p. 1209. 
" LOADES, Mary Tudor, pp. 153-157. A full report of the episode, compiled by the ambassador's 
secretary, Jean Dubois, ís transcribed and translated in the Spain Calendar, X, pp. 124, 137. 
" The impMcations of this partial collapse have been explored by RODRÍGUEZ SALGADO, M . J., 
in The Changing Face of Empire..., U51-U59, Cambridge, 1988, pp. 73-77. 
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and hugely expensive. Finally realising that concessions would have to be made to the 
Lutheran princes of the Empire, but unable to address his own conscience to the need, 
he handed over the negotiations to his brother Ferdinand. And then events in England 
(of all places) gave him a dramatic new léase of life. 
By june the young king was seriously ill, and the succession had suddenly become 
an urgent issue. By law Mary was the heir, but her rellgious stand had deeply offended 
her brother and some, at least of the regency council. Charles's ambassador in England, 
Jehan Scheyfve, who detested the Earl of Warwick for a variety of reasons, had been 
claiming for some weeks that, if the king died, Warwick would seek to deprive Mary 
of her right. It is not clear whether this claim was based on information or instinct, 
but it tumed out to be justified " . Edward wanted to exelude Mary and Warwick was 
happy to oblige. Shortly before he died, Edward declared his cousin Jane Grey to be 
his heir, excluding both his half sisters on grounds or illegitimacy. The Emperor sent 
a special embassy to watch the situation, but with no instructions to support Mary 
in the event of a struggle. He certainly believed Mary to be the heir, not by Enghsh 
law (which she was) but as Henry's only legitímate child. However, he did not believe 
that the English would accept that, and had no opinión of the princess's abñity to 
press her own claim. On the advice which he had received, he believed that Warwick 
was too strong to be defeated, and consequently instructed his ambassadors to work 
with whoever emerged as the victor ^'*. On this occasion, when it came to a conflict 
between principie and practicaüty, the latter won hands down. In this respect, however, 
Charles did not understand English situation. Not only did he have no opinión of statute 
law, which the English regarded so highly, he also thought of politics in terms of magnates 
and peasants. In the event the conflict was decided by the fact that the vast majority 
of politically significant Engüshmen accepted Henry's last succession act, and that the 
gentry, or nobiles minor raUied to her quickly and in large numbers ^'. He also under-
estimated Mary herself, because he did not see that her failure to act in 1547 had 
been the result of her belief in her brother's legitimacy. 
Little though he had contributed to it, Mary's triumph brought the Emperor great 
advantages. Within a few weeks it became clear not only that she would restore «right 
religión» —^both the mass and the papal authority— but that she would also honour 
^^  Although referred to here as the Earl of Warwick for the sake of clarity, John Dudley had 
been created Duke of Northumberland in November 1551. Scheyfve reported in April that Duke 
was plotting to alter the sucession, but he knew no details. He also seems to have been convinced 
that the king would die weeks before anyone else accepted that. As he could not have had certain 
knowledge of the latter, it seems likely that he was a natural pessimist. LOADES, D. , ]ohn Dudley, 
Duke of Northumberland, Oxford, 1996, pp. 239-240. 
'•• Calendar or State Papen, Sapnish, XI, pp. 60-65. HARBISON, E . H . , Rival Ambassadors at the 
Court of Queen Mary, Princeton, 1940, pp. 4i-44. LOADES, Mary Tudor, pp. 174-176. It seems clear 
that Charles's priority at this point was to exelude French influence rather than to secure Mar>''s success. 
" «The vita Mariae Reginae oí Robert Wingfield of Brantham», MACCULLOCH, D . (ed.), Camden 
Miscellatty, XXVIII, 1984. 
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her eighteen year oíd pledge to marry only with his advice. Both these decsions offered 
Charles great, and unexpected, opportunities. Throught his new resident ambassador, 
Simón Renard, he virtually controUed Mary during the first year of her reign, persuading 
her to marry his widower son, Philip, and to delay the restoration of the papacy until 
after the latter's arrival. They were both aware of the dangers of such a course, and 
Charles certainly understood that the English would detest the thought of a foreign 
king, and particularly a Spanish one *^. Renard not only confirmed that fear, but added 
that «the heretics» were politically strong, and that the situation was unstable and volatile; 
«ce royaulme est populaire» he wrote on one occasion ^'. We now know that these 
fears were exaggerated, and aróse largely from a common failure to understand the 
English respect for statute. They also aróse partly from the Emperor's understandable 
preoccupation with his struggle against France. Henry was infuriated by the Anglo-
Habsburg marriage treaty, but since he was already at wat with Charles, there was 
not much that he could do against the Emperor. He could, however, subvert the English, 
and Renard became convinced that is what he was doing. In fact his efforts were per-
functory, and the English were no fonder of the French than they were of the Spaniards; 
so his efforts carne to nothing, the marriage took place, and the wide Habsburg dom-
inions heralded a miracle as Philip became king of England '*. 
Then, and only then, did Charles allow the Pope's légate, Reginald Pole, to proceed 
to England, and the schismatic kingdom was restored to the church. Pole had tirelessly 
pointed out, for over a year, that it was the Emperor's first duty as the head of Chris-
tendom, to assist in the recovery of the lost sheep. Charles did not disagree, but his 
priority was to see his son safely installed; his principie on this occasion being «what 
is good for the Habsburg dynasty is good for the cathoUc church». TTie Emperor was 
probably the only person who regarded the marriage for which he was largely responsible 
as a success. When he began the protracted process of abdication in September 1555, 
he was able to hand over the Low Countries to the King of England, unchallenged 
by either the French or his own Austrian cousins, who felt with some justice that the 
provinces should have been a part of their own inheritance ^^ . He knew enough about 
Mary to have little confidence in the dynastic outcome, and was not particularly anxious 
to involve England in the war which he was trying to bring to an end. But he was 
very keen indeed to give PhiÜpe a power base in the north from which to secute his 
position in the Netherlands. By the time that he withdrew to San Yuste in 1556, he 
"• Renard wamed him repeateadly of the unpopularity of the Spaniards in England, where they 
were regarded as «proud and impertinent», e.g., Calendar of State Papen, Spanish, XI, p. 333. 
' ' Renard to the Emperor, 9th September 1553; Cal.Span., XI, pp. 227-229. 
'* E.g. 11 felicissimo ritomo del regno d'Inghiltena all cattolica unione, Rome, 1555. 
" Having been frustrated in an attempt to make Philips his heir to the Imperial title in place 
of Ferdinand, in 1548 Charles had constituted the Netherlands into the Burgundian Circle by a Prag-
tnatic Sanction. He then detatched the Circle from the Empire in all but the most formal sense, and 
settled it on Philip. RODRÍGUEZ SALGADO, Changing Face of Empire, p. 37. 
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knew that he would never see his grandson on the English throne, but he had done 
his duty, both to his family and to the church. 
This is not the place to attempt an assessement of either Charles or his reign, and 
at first sight it appears that his actions, or lacle of them, in respect of England were 
always determined by his own interests, and his view of the practical situation. However, 
it should be remembered that poütical interest would always have dictated friendship 
with England, as long as relations with France were hostíle. There was no practical 
reason why Charles should have obstructed Henry's attempt to have his first marriage 
annulled. If he had simply stood aside, Clement would have found a way to oblige 
the king, and everyone would have been spared a great deal of trouble'"'. He was 
not enforcing the law, because it was for the pope to say what the law was in such 
a case. He acted as he did because he beüeved that Henry was behaving unjustly and 
inmorally. As his own council pointed out, his relationship to the Queen of England 
was a personal matter. They did not criticise the stand which he had taken (which 
was generally approved), but they did declare that Henry had taken no action which 
the Emperor could interpret as hostñe. Charles believed that he had acted rightly, and 
in accordance with his office, and had sacrificed an amicable relationship with a useful 
ally and trading partner in the process. However, at the end of the day it did not 
cost him very much, because in spite of his high moral tone, he never put himself 
out to support the king's enemies. In fact his inaction ensured the success of Henry's 
eccentric policies, and by 1542 relations between the Holy Román Emperor and the 
schismatica king were back where they had been in 1523. Thereafter there was no 
conflict of principie and practice, merely an adjustmen of prioríties which gave Philip 
the credit for ending the English schism, rather than Mary. It was eventually Henry's 
visión of the fiíture which was to prevail, rather than Charles's, because it was Henry 
who believed that it was possible to use a sovereign legislature to change the rules 
as you went along, a position now adopted aknost without thought by every autonomous 
State. 
* The debate about the merits of Henry's case in canon law continúes, but precedents existed 
for other annullments of convenience, notably that by which Louis XII of France had been freed 
to marry his predecessor's widow, Anne of Britanny. 
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